A Unified Access Control Model for Calibration Traceability in
  Safety-Critical IoT by Shah, Ryan & Nagaraja, Shishir
An Access Control Model for Robot Calibration
Ryan Shah
ryan.shah@strath.ac.uk
University of Strathclyde
Shishir Nagaraja
shishir.nagaraja@strath.ac.uk
University of Strathclyde
ABSTRACT
High assurance surgical robotic systems require robustness to both
safety issues and security issues (i.e adversarial interference). In this
work, we argue that safety and security are not disjoint properties,
but that security is a safety requirement. Surgical robotics presents
new information flow requirements that includes multiple levels of
confidentiality and integrity, as well as the need for compartmenta-
tion arising from conflicts of interest. We develop an information
flow model that derives from lattice-based access control. This
model addresses the flow constraints of the calibration lifecycle of
surgical robots – an important aspect of a high-assurance environ-
ment.
1 INTRODUCTION
Modern robotics has transformed the way surgery is performed.
Connected surgical robots, such as the DaVinci system, are increas-
ingly playing a leading role in carrying out surgical procedures
with human assistance. Instead of a surgeon wielding a scalpel, the
robot carries out the core surgical procedures including performing
the incisions, controlling blood loss, and carrying out repair work,
under the oversight of human surgeons. Surgical robots promise
lowered risks compared with traditional procedures – quicker surg-
eries, fewer complications, lowered blood loss and transfusion rates,
and a shorter length of recovery for the patient.
As we start to use connected robots to perform critical tasks such
as performing surgical procedures on humans, several challenges
arise. First, how can we ensure that the system can operate safely
whilst being robust to attacks. Second, how can one develop a strong
tamper-resistant trail of recorded activity to enable system forensics
that will withstand hostile scrutiny in a court of law. Indeed, in the
last few years several lawsuits have been filed by patients accusing
hospitals of negligence over safety considerations when surgical
robots caused accidental injuries to patients whilst working deep
inside their bodies. These cases are illustrative of the significant
liabilities involved and the stakes involved in ensuring robotic
safety. It is natural to ask about the implications of robot safety
assurance on security in general, and for access control models in
particular.
Safety assurance is going to be about security as much as man-
aging stochastic interference. The security properties of interest in
order of priority is system availability, followed by integrity rather
than confidentiality. The importance of availability is well under-
stood – it means ensuring that the services offered by the robot is
available to the surgeon when expected. As such, other properties
are of little consequence if the robot cannot do what it should.
When integrity is intact, it means that the robot has not been
maliciously altered. To ensure robot integrity, several considera-
tions are involved. First, calibration will no longer be a yearly affair,
but a monthly one, with integrity checks in between that verify the
traceability of calibration from the hospital to the manufacturer
and their suppliers. Indeed, the liabilities of error reside not just
with the hospital and the equipment supplier, but further along the
supply chain as well. It isn’t necessary that a device vulnerability
will need to be exploited by a skilled attacker who has access to
the patient’s environment. Instead, malware controlled by a remote
attacker can launch attacks. And, it will have to be fixed imme-
diately rather than wait for the next patch to arrive. As such the
safety capital will move from an upfront cost to a continuous cost
and it will be hard to predict how much it will cost to fix, thus
impacting the bottom-line. More importantly, calibration and other
safety-assurance activities will move from a periodic or one-off
activity to a safety need that must be maintained in real-time.
So what is the appropriate authorisation framework for cali-
bration safety of surgical robots in hospitals? How can we ensure
that calibration certificates are not forged or tampered with? How
can we identify components that require calibration even though
their certificates haven’t expired? How will calibration-patches be
applied, eg. a parent device that has been used to calibrate a compo-
nent of the robot is subsequently found to have an issue, requiring
a revocation or refreshing of all certificates down the calibration
chain. How can we prevent fraudulent calibration devices (refer-
ence devices) from being used to calibrate a surgical robot? How
can we enable transparency in the calibration traceability-chain
whilst ensuring the confidentiality of who supplies to whom and
who calibrates their devices? And finally, in aid of system forensics,
how do we go about creating a tamper proof log of calibration,
adjustment, verification, and robotic operation?
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Surgical Robotics
Robotic surgery equipment, such as the da Vinci Surgical Sys-
tem [10], can provide medical professionals with robot-assistance
for procedures to improve surgical performance.
The da Vinci robot is a quadbrachial (four-arm) robot, which
are human-operated via a surgeon’s console with finger controllers
that transmit the human movements to the robot. One of the arms
consists of a camera to give the operator a high-definition view
of the surgery they are performing. As well as this, the console
also has foot pedals which, when operated, control the camera
and also procedures such as cautery. A dual-console may also be
used, which allows for another surgeon to view the procedure,
as well as takeover when relief is required. The video feed from
the camera is also transmitted to screens in an observation room,
which allows viewing of the surgery without being in the room.
A digital router in the surgical system allows for recording cases
and transmitting them to any monitor inside the room, as well
as to the Internet using a transmission device such as Polycom
HD [8]. Internet images from, for example, radiology suites can be
transmitted to the router and ultimately to the surgeon console,
providing real-time radiology images during the procedure.
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According to [9], the da Vinci robot is composed of three com-
ponents: a surgeon’s console, three cart-mounted arms (one for the
camera and two for instruments), and a vision cart. Similarly, the
Zeus system also consists of three components, which include the
console, a computer controller and three arms. On a large scale, we
consider having tens of surgical robots in a single hospital, where
each surgical robot would have a surgical console as well as a digi-
tal router to handle data inputs and outputs to other parts of the
hospital and back-end systems. We can therefore suggest that the
level of compromise is not limited to just one surgical robotics suite,
but to multiple, and adversarial threats will not just be limited to a
single operating theatre, but to many throughout the hospital. If in
the event an adversary attempts to slow down a robots process(es),
it could affect how the surgery is performed and may disrupt the
surgery or result in patient deaths in the worst case. On a scale of
tens of surgical suites, having multiple casualties would heavily
affect the reputation of a hospital and would more than likely re-
sult in lawsuits, all of which can have a detrimental impact on a
hospital’s success.
The RAVEN II surgical robot [3] is a surgical robot which includes
two mechanical arms which are used to operate two respective in-
struments. It is an experimental platformwhich contains the control
and safety mechanisms which would be found in state-of-the-art
surgical robots, and allows the robot to be teleoperated. An addi-
tional feature to the RAVEN II robot, is in-built safety mechanisms
such as an emergency stop, which puts the robot and its control
software into an emergency stop state, where a robot can only be
taken out of this state when a physical start button is pressed. This
allows the operator(s) of the robot to halt anything the robot is
doing when faced with a hazardous event.
The da Vinci surgical system is a real-world implementation of
a surgical robot, whereas the RAVEN II robot is an open-source
platform used for research in surgical robotics. However, both of
these surgical robots envelop a similar architecturewhich covers the
majority of surgical robots in use to date. [1] details that the most
critical component of surgical robots is its electronic control system,
which both receives the commands from the surgeon’s console and
translates these into robotic actions, and provides video feedback
to the surgeon’s console.
An interesting observation is that the architecture of the surgical
robotics systems we described, are the same as most industrial
robots. Quarta et al. [6] provide an experimental security analysis
of the architecture of industrial robots. In their evaluation, they
used an industrial robot, from leading vendor ABB, that consists of
the same architecture as the majority of industrial robots, and more
specifically consists of the robot system paired with a controller
than can be operated both by a human and autonomously. There is
a main control system that links the components of the robot, the
network in which it operates, and the controller together. As with
surgical robots, in industrial robotics, the control system is regarded
as one of the most safety- and security-critical components. Similar
to the da Vinci system, the industrial robots have an internal robot
network, where the components of the robot system communicate
with eachother, as well as a service network where the robot is
connected to a dedicated organisational subnet and possibly to the
Internet.
2.2 Calibration
To ensure measuring instruments provide high quality and accurate
measurements, we must ensure that they are calibrated against a
trustworthy source. All measurements have a quantifiable degree of
uncertainty and the challenge is to ensure that we can minimise this
uncertainty, while maintaining a quantifiable indication of the qual-
ity of measurement. National standards for weights and measures
are maintained by National Measurement Institutes (NMIs), such
as the National Physical Laboratory (NPL) in the United Kingdom.
NMIs define national measurement standards, which are associated
with values of uncertainty and are used to calibrate measuring
instruments.
The calibration of measuring instruments ensures that recorded
measurements are of high quality and accuracy, such that they are
compared to a standard of higher accuracy to identify errors in
instrument readings. We calibrate to meet quality audit require-
ments and ensure reference designs, subsystems and integrated
systems perform as intended. A reliable measurement should be
recorded by instruments with low measurement uncertainty and
is traceable to corresponding SI units, to a standard or reference
method [2]. Traceability is at the heart of measurements and is a ba-
sis for comparisons against valid measurements. A measurement’s
metrological traceability is its property, such that the measurement
result is related to a stated reference, through an unbroken chain
of calibrations [4].
Kaarls and Quinn state that a set of defined standard, or ref-
erence, methods can be created such that primary method(s) are
used to validate or calibrate secondary or tertiary methods, which
can be linked to a working-level method [5]. The use of primary
methods are often time consuming and costly. A trade-off for typi-
cal working-level methods induce simplicity, but increases uncer-
tainty. de Castro et Al. state the measurement uncertainty is an
operationally defined method of detailing the level of confidence
associated with a measurement [2], offering advantages over other
terms such as precision and trueness.
Surgical robots and their components are made at several manu-
facturing facilities, where each component is initially calibrated to
some national standard. The calibration is performed by a human
operator, who may be based in the equipment manufacturing facil-
ity, an intermediary calibration laboratory, and/or a top-level body
known as a National Measurement Institute (NMIs) in metrology
literature.
After calibration, the process is usually verified by another oper-
ator and then adjustments are performed if and where necessary.
This invokes a second level of confidence in the calibration of equip-
ment.With this said, operators may hold expertise and accreditation
for calibration, but not all operators may be certified (i.e. end-users
calibrating their own devices).
When a device is calibrated, it is issued with a calibration certifi-
cate. Most devices require recalibration after a specified time period,
which is at yearly intervals. From this, we note that there are threats
to the integrity of calibration certificates. For example, calibration
certificates hold a timestamp of the calibration, calibration-specific
data and the parent units that were used to calibrate the device.
This opens up scenarios where attackers may forge calibration cer-
tificates, or modify the data within a calibration certificate. The
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Figure 1: Calibration Hierarchy
attacker may add false calibration units to the certificate, and if
high level operations such as traceability were carried out, it could
reveal sensitive information to the attacker.
Some operators may also perform verification and adjustment
using the same equipment as the original calibration. If the calibra-
tion units had a high uncertainty or were miscalibrated, it could
result in inaccurate verification and/or adjustment, as well as the
initial calibration.
3 ACCESS CONTROL FOR CALIBRATION
3.1 The Calibration-Safety Access Control
Problem
Robot inspection and calibration, while necessary are not sufficient
for achieving operational safety as the calibration involves a large
number of parties, a fraction of which may act maliciously. In this
paper, we are concerned with threats which relate to the calibration
of surgical robots.
The primary approach for ensuring robot safety just before ex-
ecuting a surgical procedure, is to ensure that on-board sensory
equipment satisfies calibration traceability. Traceability means veri-
fying whether a measurement can be traced to a master device with
low measurement uncertainty. The master device is typically a very
expensive sensor (e.g. an atomic clock) with very low error and
hence fit to define a measurement standard. In high-assurance ap-
plications, traceability is an important property. Instead of taking a
calibration certificate at face value, the device operator also checks
the validity of calibration certificates of parent devices used to
calibrate a robot, and their parents, and so on until the root calibra-
tion device. Figure 1 shows how calibration information is verified
by tracing calibration certificates through a chain of hierarchical
domains.
To verify traceability, the operator needs access to genuine cali-
bration certificates pertaining to all devices on the chain between
the robot and the master calibration device. There is more to this
than just checking certificate provenance. The operational range
of each sensor component needs to be validated as well, in real
time. As an example, consider the temperature sensor mounted on
the da Vinci’s needle driver, which ensures the needle tip does not
heat up to a point that it causes burns when stitching up a wound –
a build up of scar tissue can delay recovery especially in areas of
primary repair. The sensor may be calibrated for operation from
12 to 60 Celsius and hence expected to report accurate values with
low uncertainty in this range. However, this assumption is not con-
firmed unless the parent device used to calibrate the robot’s sensor,
was also calibrated for at least the same range, and similarly all the
way up to the national standard. Also, at any point, the calibration
certificate of a parent device could be revoked or modified. In our
example, if the calibration certificate of the two-hop parent of the
robot is found to exhibit high-uncertainty above 45 Celsius, then
its calibration certificate should be revoked and replaced. The new
certificate only permits the grand-parent to act as a calibration
device up to 45 Celsius, whereas our robot already has a calibration
certificate allowing operation up to the maximum safe temperature
of 60 Celsius and is in the middle of a surgical procedure. If the robot
continues the surgery it could be operating in unsafe conditions,
and the resulting liabilities could be dumped on the operator.
The above example shows why maintaining safety is a require-
ment that must be met in real time — if a calibration patch is issued,
it needs to be applied immediately (and restrict the needle to the
maximum temperature that can be traced to national standards).
3.2 Access control model
To enable traceability and to apply calibration patches, an appro-
priate authorisation framework is essential.
To protect against information leakage and disclosure, such as
who is calibrating who’s devices, and how often the traceability
chain is checked for integrity, we propose an information flow
model that leverages existing notions of access control to manage
the multiple levels of confidentiality, integrity, and conflicts of
interest sets. The proposed hybrid model naturally builds on the
BLP model, the BIBA model, and the Chinese Wall model.
3.2.1 Multi-level integrity. Fortunately, a calibration hierarchy nat-
urally exists in the world of calibration. If we design the authori-
sation framework well, then we can reduce the number of critical
components by an order of magnitude. To show how, a robot de-
ployed in a hospital, as illustrated in Figure 2, has thousands of
components (sensors and actuators) at the bottom most level, with
every ten or so sensors calibrated by a level-2 units, every ten level-
2 calibration units are in turn calibrated by one level-1 calibration
unit. If we can ensure that the compromise of a level-1 unit or its
signing keys can only cause limited damage by impacting com-
ponents within its immediate locality, as opposed to widespread
damage. Starting with the master calibration level, at each subse-
quent level, the number of critical components calibrated is reduced
by one order of magnitude.
3
Figure 2: CalibrationhierarchywithPKI andmonitoring ser-
vices
It is plausible to map the components of the calibration hier-
archy to real actors within the calibration chain without a lot of
imagination. A component’s calibration certificate could potentially
reveal the facility at which the calibration was performed. In the
case of NMIs, the information is globally available, and thus the
mapping of the component to themselves does not succumb to
any confidentiality concerns. However, in the case of intermediary
facilities, who do not wish to reveal information to levels above
and below them, a mapping of components becomes a concern. For
example, the calibration certificates contain information about the
calibration units used to calibrate the component being mapped,
as well as measurements recorded throughout calibration. This
would potentially leak confidential information about the actors
performing the calibration, in this case the intermediary facility, as
well as the internal calibration architecture and processes of the
facility.
We assume that level-0 and level-1 calibration units will be
trusted with a chance for error or misconfiguration. At level-2
there will be some chance of compromise, since these devices will
come in contact with field devices. The calibration software running
at level-1 and level-2 might be compromised or misbehave uninten-
tionally. Some proportion of field components (devices and sensors)
may be compromised at any time, and as the measurements drawn
from such devices suffer from very high uncertainty, nothing can
be assumed of them.
3.2.2 Multi-level confidentiality. The timing of integrity checks
(traceability chain) could leak information about the timing of sur-
gical procedures, thus potentially breaking patient confidentiality.
For instance, when combined with other sources of information,
such as the time of patient admission and exit and the calibration-
traffic fingerprint, it may be possible to accurately estimate which
patients will be served by a DaVinci robot and for what medical
Figure 3: Access Control Model
condition. Aside from timing and frequency of checks, the verifica-
tion of a traceability chain should not reveal information about the
deployment to intermediaries involved between the deployed robot
and the public-facing national measurement institute. The reason
for this is simple: calibration traffic from intermediaries could leak
confidential information to parties further in the chain. As an exam-
ple, a device manufacturer might use the services of a third party to
calibrate the robot’s sensors but does not want to reveal who this
third party is. Thus an important requirement is that the traceability
chain of the robot should be verifiable without leaking information
about the hospital to the intermediate providers of calibration ser-
vices, and likewise from the providers to the measurement standard
bodies (National Measurement Institutes).
This motivates a multilevel security policy designed to protect
confidentiality like BLP. We place the robotic device at the top
level of highest confidentiality, as much of the meta information
around calibration traffic is directly or indirectly linked to patient
confidentiality and the hospital’s operational confidentiality. This
information cannot be leaked even to the providers of calibration
services and the OEMs of surgical robotic equipment, who are
one level below the hospital. So the OEM and calibration service
providers can be consulted by the deployment to query traceability
(read up) without allowing the providers to learn any information
about the state of the surgical robot (no write down). Finally at
the bottom most level, we place the National Measurement Insti-
tutes’ master calibration devices who have no secrets to keep, but
should not have access to any meta information about traceability
chain verifications from the deployment site or calibration-service
providers.
3.2.3 Chinese walls. Robots also require periodic recalibration.
Here the concern is of unintended disclosure. A calibration en-
gineer who works for a robot-maintenance company cannot be
allowed to calibrate robots for competing companies. Indeed, cali-
bration software and equipment belonging to a calibration engineer
could contain embedded malware trojans which are deployed at
one company. The calibration process could then be exploited as
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an attack vector to transfer malware to competitors, leading to a
situation where information disclosures occur between companies
having a conflict of interest. In rare cases, a crooked calibration
engineer might collect business sensitive information as derived
from device logs and resell such information to competitors. Thus
we have a set of companies including OEMs and third parties that
provide calibration services to hospitals. These companies are in
direct competition with each other and are thus partitioned into
conflict of interest sets. Therefore, it is important to protect against
the disclosure of sensitive information across companies.
3.3 Information flow model
In summary, we have a set of intermediaries (OEMs and third par-
ties that provide calibration services to hospitals), all of whom
have confidentiality requirements. The device is at the highest level
of confidentiality while the NMI’s information is public (unclassi-
fied). Simultaneously, we havemeasurement-integrity requirements
which flow from the NMI (highest integrity) to the intermediaries
on to the field-level surgical robots in hospitals (lowest integrity).
While managing these confidentiality and integrity requirements,
we need to further protect against hospitals and intermediaries
who are in direct competition with each other. This means a hybrid
access control model that builds on BLP, BIBA, and the Chinese
wall model [7]. We now define terms used in subsequent discussion.
(Definition) Conflict-of-interest set is defined as the set of subsets
where each subset corresponds to calibration-service providers
in a direct conflict of interest with each other. Following stan-
dard notation, we denote the set of n conflict of interest sets as
{COI1,COI2, . . . ,COIn }. Each setCOIi = {1, 2, 3, . . . ,mi } contains
the set ofmi providers that are in conflict.
(Definition) Set of integrity labels is denoted asΩ = {ω1,ω2, . . . ,ωq }.
Each integrity label corresponds to a unique integrity level.
(Definition) Security labels are defined as a set of two n-sized
vectors {[ii , i2, . . . , in ], [pi ,p2, . . . ,pn ]}, where i j ∈ {COIj ∪ ⊥ ∪
T }, pj ∈ Ω and 1 ≤ j ≤ n. i j =⊥ signifies that the calibration
traceability chain does not contain information from any provider in
COIj . i j = T means that the calibration traffic contains information
from at least two providers who are in a conflict of interest setCOIj .
i j ∈ COIj means that the calibration traffic contains information
from the corresponding service provider in COIj . And, pj ∈ Ω
denotes the integrity component of the security label.
(Definition) Dominance relations: Next, we define dominance
relations between the labels as follows, where the notation lj [ik ]
denotes the ithk element of label lj . We say that security label l1 domi-
nates label l2 denoted by l1 ≥ l2 iff. ∀ik ,pk = (1, 2, . . . ,n)[((l1[ik ] =
l2[ik ]) ∨ (l2[ik ] =⊥) ∨ (l1[ik ] = T )) ∧ (l1[pk ] ≤ l2[pk ])].
In other words, l1 dominates l2 provided that l1 and l2 agree
whenever l2 is not public or in conflict and the integrity level of l2
is higher than that of l1. Information flows in the opposite direction
of dominance, if l1 > l2 then information can flow from level 2 to
level 1 but not vice versa. The dominance relation is transitive. The
public level corresponding to the National Measurement Institute
outputs{[⊥,⊥, . . . ,⊥], [ωq ]}, is dominated by all the other levels.
Similarly, system high is denoted by {[T ,T , . . . ,T ], [ω1]}, domi-
nates all the other levels. Note that the dominance relation defines
a lattice structure, where level public denoted by {[⊥,⊥, . . . ,⊥
], [ωq ]} appears at the bottom and the level trusted appears at the
top. Incomparable levels are not connected in this lattice structure.
Although we have both integrity and confidentiality require-
ments, these are complimentary. Our information flow model is an
instance of Sandhu’s observation that BIBA and BLP are the same
model. This becomes true in our case as the level with the highest
integrity (Master calibration reference) is also the level with the
lowest confidentiality requirements, and likewise the level with
the highest confidentiality (hospital) has the highest measurement
uncertainty and thus the lowest integrity. This means that there is
no contradiction between the information flow rules of BIBA and
those of BLP. The rules for information flow as they apply to the
hybrid model shown in Figure 3, are as follows:
(1) Simple property: A principal (S) may read a calibration cer-
tificate (O), only if L(S) ≥ L(O).
(2) Confinement within chinese walls: A calibration service
provider (S) can only calibrate a device (O), if the security
label of the device dominates that of the service provider i.e
if L(O) ≥ L(S).
The notation style are based on the work of Sandhu [7].
4 CALIBRATION LIFECYCLE AND ACCESS
CONTROL
Overall, we note there are three phases of the robot calibration life
cycle: (1) initial calibration of a device, (2) recalibration after expiry
of calibration certificates, and (3) authorising recalibration from
other factors (e.g. upper-layer calibration units require recalibra-
tion).
Figure 4: New Calibration Architecture
4.1 Initial Calibration
A device’s initial calibration is the first step which outputs a cali-
bration certificate, specific to the device, and becomes part of the
traceability chain. Its initial calibration is primarily performed in
two ways: by the device manufacturer in the manufacturing organ-
isation’s calibration facility, or by NMIs. Based on the notion that
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the device is assigned to part of the traceability chain for the first
time, we hereby refer to a device’s initial calibration as the birth of
the device.
In Figure 4, we identify what is required for the birth of a device
into the calibration network, how measurements are sent securely
to the receiver, how one can perform a lookup for the calibration
certificate of a device and finally, how the information is stored.
4.1.1 Device Birth. The birth metaphor inspired by biology helps
describe the behaviour which implements secure initialisation of
the device by imprinting it with a key pair. This work is done at
the one of the intermediate levels {[⊥,⊥, . . . ,OEMi , . . . ,⊥][ωj ]}
of confidentiality and integrity corresponding to the organisation
OEMi .
When a device is born, a public and private key pair, which we
refer to as Kdpub and K
d
pr i , is embedded into the device firmware
when it is inserted into a manufacturer or OEM’s calibration sta-
tion. This is the only time credentials can be imprinted. Kdpub is
then signed by the manufacturer’s signing key KMpri . This creates a
link between the manufacturer and the device, which can be used
to verify device measurements by tracing them to high-integrity
devices via the chain of calibration certificates – i.e the device’s
calibration status, and the calibration status of the parent device
used for calibration, its grandparent, and so on up to the master
calibration device.
A calibration operator (calibrator) then performs the calibra-
tion process. Calibration can only be performed by a calibrator
if they don’t have a conflict of interest with the device OEM i.e
L(OEMi ) ≥ L(TPj ) where i is the index of the OEM and j is the
index corresponding to the third party acting as calibration-service
provider. The output of the calibration process is a calibration cer-
tificate with security label {[⊥,⊥, . . . ,OEMi , . . . ,TPj , . . . ,⊥][ωi ]}.
Since, the certificate contains information about the OEM manu-
facturing the device and the Third Party (TP) that carries out the
calibration, the security label assigned lists the company names in
the respective conflict of interest classes. As show in Table 1, the
certificate contains information about its parent calibration units,
the calibrator, and a measurement functionM : x → y, where y is
the corrected output for a given measurement x produced by the
device’s sensor. Additionally, a timestamp field details the time at
which the calibration certificate was produced, and the expiry field
specifies the expiration time and date of the certificate, used to alert
recalibration. The calibrator then signs the calibration certificate
with their private key, to bind all the certificate elements together
and link the device to the calibrator.
Transmitting Measurements. Once a device is born and ready to
use in the field, it generates measurements signed with its private
signing key Kdprv . Measurements are unstructured pieces of data
which may or may not be continuously streamed to the receiver.
4.1.2 Lookup for Calibration Certificates. As depicted in Figure 4,
the subject requesting the calibration certificate for a device would
send a lookup request to the OEM, i.e. OEMi . The lookup request
would succeed if the label of the requester dominated that of the
certificate.
Calibration Certificate
Device ID
Kdpub
Timestamp
Expiry
DID1 DID2 . . . DIDn
Calibration Factor 92.4%
Voltage Reflection Coefficient 0.01
. . . . . .
Table 1: Calibration certificate
Measurement ID Device ID Timestamp Payload ⊙ Kdpr i
Measurement Structure
4.2 Calibration Traceability Verification
After device birth, the manufacturer will hold the device until it is
placed at its deployment site, such as the hospital. The device will
now have to undergo secure association with the deployment site,
such that it is now loyal to the deployment site and not the manufac-
turer. This can be achieved by establishing a shared key between the
two principals involved namely the hospital and the device. Since
both have public key pairs that can be authenticated, i.e the robot
is convinced that the hospital has a valid operating license and the
hospital is convinced that the device isn’t fake or miscalibrated. A
simple approach might just be to use Diffie-Hellman key exchange
over a physical cable connected to the surgeons console on one
end and the robot on the other. Both the robot and the surgeon’s
console have a screen, so a hash of the key may be displayed and
verified manually in the interest of simplicity.
To perform a traceability operation, read request for the robot’s
calibration certificated will be submitted by the hospital to the
access control system. The access control system will check that
the security label of the hospital (subject) dominates that of the
robot’s calibration certificate generated during initial calibration.
This is expected to be permitted as the hospital is a few levels above
the hospital. If the calibration certificate is successful retrieved and
verified, the integrity label of the subject will be increased to that
of the parent device (device calibrator). The process is reiterated
by the subject to retrieve the calibration certificate of the parent
device. At each iteration the integrity level associated with the
robot increases. This process carries on until the highest integrity
(bottom level of NMI) is reached. Thus calibration traceability of
the robot starts at ω1 at the top level and concludes until it reaches
maximal integrity at ωp .
If the read operation attempts to read from a label with a conflict
of interest, or if an attempt was made to read from a lower integrity
label than that of the requester, the read will be denied and the
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traceability operation will fail, assuming that we have not reached
ωp , the bottom layer NMIs, which is the end point of the traceabil-
ity chain. In this case, the surgeon knows that the measurement
uncertainty of the robots’ sensors is not minimised. The hospital
might decide to postpone the procedure and get a new calibrator
carried out that resolves the conflict of interest, or decide to take the
risk and operate. In either case, the risk is identified via a manda-
tory access control model, and the hospital has the opportunity to
address the issue.
4.3 Recalibration
When the expiry date and time has passed, informed by the expiry
field in the device’s calibration certificate, the device is deemed unfit
for measurements or calibration as it may have a higher uncertainty
in measurements from before or may be drifting from its norm.
Therefore, it must be recalibrated to ensure that its measurements
are of the correct accuracy and uncertainty defined by how far it is
from the SI units atop the traceability chain.
Recalibration is usually performed by the calibrator who issued
the previous certificate for the device. In accordance with our access
control model 3, the calibrator can write upwards to the calibration
certificate if there is no conflict of interest. This is done under
the assumption that calibration units from upper levels are not
out-of-calibration.
The recalibration process outputs a new calibration certificate
and the previous certificate will be archived, both with the same
label as the existing calibration certificate.
4.4 Recalibration arising from certificate
revocation
Aside from expiration of a calibration certificate, devices may be
recalibrated based on several events. For example, parental calibra-
tion units, in the traceability chain with the device as the starting
node, may be out of calibration and thus all subsequent units in the
chain would require recalibration.
The SI units, from which NMIs calibrate their master calibration
units, have recently updated, and so all master units and those below
in the chain would need to be calibrated. This is a highly uncommon
event, but is still regarded as a factor that affects whether or not
devices and units need recalibrating.
5 CONCLUSION
In this work, we have presented a new access control model for
surgical robotics. We have highlighted that when we shift to a par-
adigm in which components of surgical robotics suites are internet-
connected, safety-critical problems also become a security problem.
From a problem-space surrounding internet-connected surgi-
cal robots to the calibration infrastructure which encapsulates its
components, we derive information flow constraints. From this, we
developed an access control model, which captures notions of access
control from the BIBA, BLP, and Chinese wall models, thus fulfill-
ing confidentiality and integrity requirements across a multi-level
hierarchy, whilst compartmentalising hierarchical components so
as to avoid conflicts of interest.
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